Sunday 31 October 2021
The proliferation of nuclear weapons in any region is likely to create some degree of security concerns both regionally and globally; such concerns are more likely to be magnified and appear even more prominent due to instability and uncertainty in the Middle East. If Iran were to have nuclear weapons, the nuclear build-up would increase both their detonating abilities and reach. Such a scenario could force other countries in the region to get involved in some form of nuclear weapons race to counteract the perceived risks posed by Iran. It is worth noting that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed in several of its reports that Iran is accelerating uranium enrichment and is very close to making a nuclear weapon.
According to some analysts in the west, the risks associated with the Iranian nuclear programme, especially to its Gulf neighbours, are not based on the assumption that Iran would deploy or threaten to deploy nuclear weapons offensively against neighbouring states, but rather that their possession of such weapons would embolden them ito use their conventional forces aggressively against neighbouring states. Contrariwise, others argue that the overwhelming preponderance of historical evidence suggests nuclear weapons have been a stabilising influence on international politics, imposing rationality and caution on the part of nuclear powers. The leading case in point: The US-USSR nuclear arsenals contributed to what diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis dubbed ‘the Long Peace’ – a period of history inimitably characterised by the absenteeism of violent conflict between the major powers. A more contemporary case of nuclear deterrence is the example of India and Pakistan and the nuclear explosions of May 1998. This event revived scholarly debate on the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional peace and stability after the Cold War. However, some analysts (Neorealists) explain the situation in terms of security, namely, India’s nuclear weapons deter the conventional and nuclear military threat posed by China and the nuclear threat posed by Pakistan. The central tenant of nuclear deterrence is that the chief impact of nuclear weapons is to deter war between their possessors.
Arab nuclear weapons
Most of the prominent analysts in this field consider the Iranian nuclear programme a cause of high threat perceptions among different nations. The GCC States consider that by acquiring nuclear weapons, Iran might become more assertive in the Gulf and the Middle East region. Yet, the GCC’s relations with Iran are complex, involving considerable trade relations and the possibility of cooperation in many areas. Despite Iranian-Saudi efforts to start sustainable relations during the new Iranian president's assumption of the presidency, the Arab Gulf is transitioning through a very volatile and unpredictable period amid high tensions between the main countries. The major factors that might influence, or have influenced, the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia include the sectarian divisions between the Sunnis in Saudi Arabia and the Shias in Iran; economic factors; and, aspirations for Gulf power. Indeed, Saudi Arabia views Iran’s nuclear programme from multiple perspectives. These include : a potential existential threat; an enabler of Iranian militancy across the region (and among Gulf Shia); a coercive tool in Gulf diplomacy; and, as an affront to Saudi leadership in the Islamic world. Therefore, Saudi Arabia believes that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons will contribute to instability, especially in its interference in the Arab region (Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon). The Saudi crown prince has previously stated that Saudi Arabia reserves the right to arm itself with nuclear weapons if the international community or the P5+1 cannot prevent Iran from moving forward with its nuclear programme. Some reports indicate that Saudi Arabia is determined to produce nuclear fuel for civilian and military uses by building 16 nuclear reactors over the next two decades, which in turn prompted other countries in the region to express their intention to develop nuclear energy, including the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Turkey. However, the US government and European countries expressed their fears towards this step, fearing that the Saudi government would use such technologies to revive the nuclear sector and build nuclear weapons. Recently a chill in bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States has been noted, as the latter lifted some sanctions on Iran before starting nuclear negotiations, the reason may be due to the Saudi's control over the oil market and the raising of the barrel ceiling value, irking the American side. Therefore, the United States is working to make concessions to Iran and to conclude a nuclear agreement to ensure its return to the international oil market, and to use Iranian oil as an alternative to Saudi’s. This is in turn viewed as a weakness of sorts by the Israeli side, especially since the American administration has no alternative but a diplomatic solution.
For non-immediate countries like Egypt and Turkey, the threat appears to be indirect and hence these nations are more concerned about the balance of power and loss of relative status and influence in the region. Indeed, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will have security repercussions for Arab states beyond the immediate Arab Gulf area. Syria and Egypt are geopolitically central to Middle Eastern security and will see their interests most directly affected by Iran’s nuclear weapons power. So the possibility for any serious counteraction is relatively higher in this case. In contention with the views, some political analysts claim that certain countries in the Arab world, particularly Egypt, Syria and Libya (although Libya has since been dismantled as a state) have abandoned their interests in developing their own nuclear programmes perhaps due to fear of negative consequences.
Israel and the Iranian nuclear programme
Israel considers Iran an enemy for supporting Palestine’s cause concerning the disputed Palestinian territories, citing Israel as an illegal state. Although there have been no major direct confrontations between Iran and Israel, their dislike for each other has been well documented. According to Iran’s formal comments,Israel are perpetually ‘genocidal in nature’ and the Iranian press which was circulated by the Fars News Agency – originating at the website Alef, which has ties to the Supreme Leader – called for the destruction of the Jews.
Iran’s nuclear development caused worldwide attention and fear for the safety of Israel, amid the threat from an eventual nuclear attack from Iran. Israel’s geographic proximity alone makes them vulnerable if Iran were ever to misuse their nuclear capabilities. Moreover, Iranian financial and military support has enabled the existence of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iraq-based proxy groups, which complicates the US’s efforts to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and stabilize Iraq. These issues further complicate the power dynamics of the Gulf region and Iran seems to emerge as a dominant power in the region. It is evident that Israel, along with the US and other countries, oppose the Iranian nuclear programme as they fear that a nuclear-rich Iran poses a severe threat to their region. Israel also backs the US’ policy aimed at preventing the development of nuclear weapons by Iran. Israel is also very keen to support any efforts made by countries or international organisations which prevent the development of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, Israelis across the political spectrum believe that the actual usage of Iranian nuclear weapons against Israel is a strong likelihood, especially amid the widespread view that extremist ideology is a major catalyst of Iranian actions. Indeed, the long-standing association between Iran and the terror groups, such as, Hezbollah and Hamas is of paramount concern. The dangers of further nuclear proliferation to a nuclear Iran do not affect all nations equally, with the threats or risks associated with these type of relationship being of greater concern to Iran’s immediate neighbours, including Israel. The Israeli administration considers that acknowledgment or recognition of the Iranian nuclear programme by the US could in fact trim down Israel’s ‘manoeuvability in the region’. In this respect, Some analysts point out that a clear divergence between Israel and US exists when it comes to the red lines on the nuclear programme. This may be the reason for the perceived weakening influence of the Jewish lobby in the United States pertaining to this matter Consequently, Israel pressurises the US and other international organisations to adopt strict measures for restricting Iran in their nuclear activities. In addition, Israel presented options related to agreeing to the nuclear agreement with Iran and the P5+1 group, including the policy of dismantling in exchange for dismantling, i.e. dismantling the Iranian nuclear program, followed by the dismantling of the sanctions regime imposed on Iran. Furthermore Israel asked the United States to apply comprehensive economic pressure on Iran in the event of the failure of negotiations, or even resort to military intervention to work on pressurising Iran through the Israeli Prime Minister's strategy of "death by a thousand cuts". The intention of Israel's strategy towards Iran is to carry out small intelligence or military operations, as is the case in the last penetration operation (cyber-attack), where Israel’s government claimed the bombing at the Iranian Natanz nuclear facility, described by some as a provocation to Iran. Will the coming period witness an increase in intelligence operations or the so-called cold war between the Iranian and Israeli sides?
In conclusion, it is not known what scenario the negotiations of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 will lead to, and it must be concluded that the nuclear programme of Iran has the capability to bring about major changes in the military activities of the Gulf region, which in turn may lead to a shift in regional alliances. The Gulf States must work to secure the security of the Gulf through the establishment of strong regional alliances to confront, inter alia, Iranian nuclear piracy, and its threats.
References:
• Reiss, M. B. (2010). A nuclear armed Iran: Possible security and diplomatic implications. Council on Foreign Relations, working paper. Reporters Without Borders. (2015). 2015 World Press Freedom Index.
• Mattair, D. (2007). Mutual threat perceptions in the Arab/ Persian Gulf: GCC perceptions. Middle East Policy Council.
• Aarts, P. and Van Duijne, J. (2009) Saudi Arabia After the U.S.-Iranian Détente: Left in the Lurch? Middle East Policy. 26(3), pp. 64-78.
• Ravid, B. (2021) Israeli pm presented Biden with "Death by a thousand cuts" iran strategy, Axios. Available at: https://www.axios.com/2021/08/27/naftali-bennett-joe-biden-meeting-iran-strategy (Accessed: January 31, 2023).